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CIVIL GIDEON, REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS,
AND PARENTAL RIGHT TERMINATION:
A CURIOUS INTERSECTION
ARJUN RANGARAJAN*
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether a party has a Constitutional right to
competent representation of counsel in civil lawsuits has usually
been answered in the negative by courts. There is good reason
for that - typically parties are fighting over money and no one's
physical liberty is at stake. It would be in society's best interest
to conserve the state's resources in such lawsuits and let the par-
ties provide their own counsel.
However, there are some situations where there is more at
stake than just money. Two examples are the risk of deportation
in an immigration proceeding, and the risk of losing custody in
juvenile dependency proceedings. Although in theory both are
civil lawsuits where the physical liberty of a person is not under
threat, it is not unreasonable to think of these two proceedings
as, in some senses, infringing upon a fundamental right. They
are also two practice areas where it is very common to see inef-
fective assistance of counsel, and they affect sections of society
that are typically poor and cannot afford lawyers. Studies have
shown that immigrants who are compelled to represent them-
selves are five times more likely to lose their cases.'
* J.D. 2014, UCLA School of Law. The author would like to thank Laurie
Taylor, Lecturer in Law, UCLA School of Law.
I NEW YORK IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION STUDY REPORT, ACCESSING
JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL To NEW YORK IMMI-
GRANTS IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 11 (2012).
1
Rangarajan: Civil Gideon, Removal Proceedings and Parental Right Termination:
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice )88
An interesting area of overlap is a scenario where a parent is
facing deportation from the United States, away from his or her
child who will remain in the United States. In effect, that is a
termination of parental rights.
So how have courts ruled on these two issues and how have
legislatures treated the two areas? Surprisingly differently;
partly because one is governed by state law and the other is a
federal issue. In immigration proceedings, the closest we have
come to affording right to counsel was in a recent case in which
the Central District of California recognized the right to repre-
sentation for mentally incompetent immigration detainees fac-
ing deportation.2
On the other hand, California allows, by statute, the right to
counsel in proceedings where termination of parental rights may
result. In addition to these statutory rights, an indigent parent
may in some cases have a right to counsel under due process
implications. 3 Immigration proceedings that result in termina-
tion of parental rights are in a curious no man's land that cannot
be reached by state law.
In this paper, I aim to introduce the concept of right to coun-
sel, and briefly examine the history of the right to counsel in
civil proceedings. I will then compare two cases,: Gonzalez and
Kristin H, and examine if there is any policy reason to treat the
subjects of these two cases differently. I will then explore the
intersection of the two areas in a case in which deportation in-
volves the termination of parental rights. In that context, I ex-
amine a marginally related Ninth Circuit case where removal
would potentially result in termination of parental rights.
Finally, I will make some recommendations and observations
regarding how this unfortunate situation, the absence of the
2 Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258 (C.D. Cal.
2013).
3 In re Kristin H., 46 Cal. App. 4th 1635, 1659 (Cal. App. 1996).
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right to counsel in removal proceedings effectively resulting in
termination of parental rights, may perhaps be remedied.
I. CIVIL GIDEON
Judge Sweet, of the Southern District of New York, made
oneOne of the earliest arguments for the right to counsel in civil
cases in his 1997 Arps lecture. 4 "In short, we need a civil
Gideon5 ," he said, "that is, an expanded constitutional right to
counsel in civil matters." Previously, in Gideon, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in all criminal cases was a fundamental right applicable
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court's rea-
soning was that the right to counsel represented a "fundamental
right" much like the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech, or the Fifth Amendment right to fair compensation dur-
ing a government 'taking' of property because criminal trials po-
tentially resulted in the loss of liberty.7
A. Right to Counsel in Dependency Proceedings
1. Under U.S. Constitution
The Supreme Court was asked to consider the availability of
appointed counsel in a case that involved termination of paren-
tal rights, Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Services.8 In Lassiter, the
court observed that there was a presumption against the right to
appointed counsel in cases that do not result in loss of physical
liberty, and thus held that there was no right to counsel in such
4 The Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society,
17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (1998). He went on to speak specifically about
cases that would potentially result in termination of parental rights.
5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
7 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341.
8 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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cases under the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause.9 There-
fore, the trial court could only address the issue of counsel ap-
pointment on a case-by-case basis.10
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissenters, pointed out that
before Gideon the right to counsel in state criminal cases re-
quired an 'unworkable' case-by-case analysis.11 He argued that
procedural norms were meant to "protect litigants against un-
predictable and unchecked governmental action," precisely the
kind involved in parental rights cases.' 2 Hence, he suggested
that the Constitutional Due Process guarantee would require
appointment of counsel.13
California courts have held that when a parent has established
that he or she has a due process right to counsel in a specific
case per Lassiter, he or she is entitled to effective counsel14. Oth-
erwise, such a right would simply be a "hollow right." 15
2. Under State Statutes (California)
Nevertheless, subsequent to (and to some extent before)
Lassiter many states have statutorily allowed for appointed
counsel in parental termination cases. 16 Not surprisingly, Cali-
fornia's statute provides not just for the right to counsel, but
9 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. It has long been recognized that the Sixth
Amendment applies only to criminal cases.
10 "Whether due process requires appointment of counsel in any given case
would depend upon the weighing of private and governmental interests, and
the risk of an erroneous decision." Kristin, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1659 (citing to
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28.).
11 Id. at 35-36.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 In re Christina P. 175 Cal. App. 3d 115, 129 (Cal. App. 1985).
15 Id.
16 Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental -Rights Termi-
nation Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
179, 193 (2004) ("According to Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia provided counsel to parents in termination cases by 1981.")").
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also for the right to competent counsel. California Welfare and
Institutions Code states: "All parties who are represented by
counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to compe-
tent counsel."' 7 The family code further states: "If a parent ap-
pears without counsel and is unable to afford counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel for the parent, unless that representation
is knowingly and intelligently waived."18
3. California Case law Interpreting Statutes
Expounding on the statutory right to counsel in dependency
proceedings, the California Court of Appeals in In re Kristin H.
held that the legislature's provision for competent counsel nec-
essarily implied a right to judicial review of claims of incompe-
tence of counsel.19 In other words, the mother's claim of
ineffective assistance was cognizable in the Court of Appeal as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 20 The reasoning behind the
court's conclusion provides some valuable insight regarding its
impression of the right to counsel in civil proceedings in general.
Kristin H. was a four-year old girl who had been living with
her mother for most of her childhood. 21 Her mother was upset
over a friend's recent death, and after snorting a line of some
substance (that she thought was "either coke or meth"), felt sick
and was paralyzed.22 Kristin's mother then alerted her psychia-
trist, her neighbor, her sister, and her boyfriend, Emilio Diaz. 23
Diaz called 911. When the police arrived, they found a mirror
and a plastic straw containing a residue of a white powder in a
location that could be reached by Kristin.24 Kristin was taken
17 CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 317.5(A) (2014).
18 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7862. (2014).
19 Kristin H., 46 Cal. App. 4th at 1642; see supra note 11, supra.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1643.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2-015
5
Rangarajan: Civil Gideon, Removal Proceedings and Parental Right Termination:
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
into protective custody.25 There had been two prior incidents
where the mother had failed to adequately supervise Kristin ac-
cording to the Department of Family and Children's Services
services. 26
During her visits with Kristin, the mother was visibly upset
that the authorities had kept Kristin away from her. The mother
and Kristin seemed to share a deep bond, and the mother com-
plained about the incompetence of the social worker and about
the rules at the facility.27 Subsequently, the social worker recom-
mended that Kristin be reunited with her mother because the
"visits were going well".28 However, soon after receiving this
positive report from the social worker, the mother once again
lost her temper during a visit to see her daughter.29 Police had to
be called in to defuse the situation.
The trial court then suspended the mother's visitation pending
a psychiatric evaluation. Based partly on the medical report, the
court wrote: "Despite the extraordinary efforts of the social
worker, the mother's continuing inability to follow medical ad-
vice makes it detrimental to return Kristin to her mother's care
at this time." 30 It concluded that Kristin would not be returned
to her mother. Kristin filed her own notice of appeal, where,
among other things, she stated that she had not received ade-
quate representation by counsel.31
The Court of Appeals concluded that the record fully sup-
ported the finding that there was a substantial risk Kristin would
suffer serious physical harm while with her mother and moved
on to the issue of the writ of habeas corpus.32 The mother's argu-
ment was that her counsel had failed to present favorable evi-
25 Id.
26 See id. at 1644.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 1645.
29 Id. at 1646.
30 Id. at 1648-49.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1657, 1658.
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dence regarding her mental state in the form of an expert
psychiatric evaluation performed by Dr. Charles DeLong.33
In evaluating the merits, the Court of Appeal stated:
Courts which have taken the contrary view [sic]
reason that dependency proceedings are civil in
nature and that their primary purpose is not to
prosecute the parent but to protect the child. [cita-
tions.] Several assumptions underlie this reason-
ing: civil proceedings involve property rights, not
personal liberties; appeal on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel should be reserved for those
cases involving fundamental interests; allowing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will
cause delay and consequently does not serve the
best interests of the child.34
The Court of Appeal also noted the overlap between a Sec-
tion 300 dependency proceeding and a termination proceeding,
especially given that both processes were governed by one com-
prehensive statutory scheme. 35 Although the court agreed that
the child's interest must be given significant weight in depen-
dency and termination proceedings, it did not agree that this
necessarily meant that a parent did not have the right to assert
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court's rationale behind finding a right to civil assistance
of counsel in such proceedings is worth noting:
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1660.
35 Id. at 1661 ("Practically speaking, once the state has become involved in
the parent/child relationship through a section 300 dependency proceeding,
there is a substantial possibility that the parent may lose custody of the child
or be separated from the child for significant periods of time. Like termina-
tion proceedings, dependency proceedings may work a unique kind of depri-
vation. Indeed, they are frequently the first step on the road to permanent
severance of parental ties.")
Volume 8, Number 2 Sp~ring 2015
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Although parents in dependency proceedings are
not prosecuted as defendants, petitions often con-
tain allegations of criminal activity. The proceed-
ings are adversarial in nature [citation]. The
governmental agency is represented by its own
counsel and employs professional social workers
who are empowered to investigate the family situ-
ation and to testify against the parent. Moreover,
the possible end result of the process, namely the
total and irrevocable severance of the parent-child
relationship, has been acknowledged as a punitive
sanction. (See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22
(1978) accompanying the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 [re-
moval of a child from the parents is a penalty as
great, if not greater, than a criminal penalty]. Cali-
fornia statutes and rules of court recognize the
gravity of the possible deprivation involved in de-
pendency proceedings and the importance of pro-
tecting the fundamental rights of parents and
ensuring a fair and accurate adjudication.
Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that the mother's stat-
utory right to competent counsel entitled her to raise a claim
through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and hence re-
manded the case to the trial court with an order to show cause. 36
As I will note during the rest of this paper, much of the ratio-
nale from the quoted paragraphs above applies equally to re-
moval proceedings in immigration cases.
B. Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings
Removal proceedings, previously referred to as "deportation
proceedings", are those in which the United States government
36 Id. at 1667, 1672.
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seeks to forcibly remove an inadmissible non-United States citi-
zen from the country.37 It is commonly acknowledged that re-
moval proceedings involve situations where much is at stake for
the detainee, and hence the need for effective assistance of
counsel is high.38 Sadly, the percentage of detainees facing re-
moval that are represented by counsel, is often very low,
roughly 50% for the 2007-2011 period3 9
Justice Douglas, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court, rightly
pointed out that "[t]hough deportation is not technically a crimi-
nal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and
deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom. That deportation is a penalty - at times a most seri-
ous one - cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exer-
cised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty
not meet the essential standards of fairness." 40
There are numerous similarities between removal and depen-
dency proceedings: both involve more than money damages;
both involve the taking away of what can be considered "funda-
mental rights"; and both are adversarial in nature. However, a
key difference is that child custody is an area of state law,
whereas immigration is an area governed exclusively by the fed-
eral government. While courts recognize a critical competing in-
terest of a child in dependency cases, federal courts in
immigration cases do not weigh this critical competing interest.
37 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Re-
sidents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2399 (2013); See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229A (2006)
(providing for removal proceedings). Deportation proceedings are now
called removal proceedings after the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft,
291 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[The U.S. government] did not commence
[deportation] proceedings[,] now called "removal" proceedings under
IIRIRA.")
38 See e.g., Johnson, supra note 37, at 2399; Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal
Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 3, 5-8 (2008).
39 Johnson, supra note 37, at 2399.
40 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2015
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The next few sections examine how the right to counsel has
been treated in immigration cases. Immigration proceedings are
classified as and proceed in the form of civil proceedings.41 Ac-
cordingly, the court has discretion over the appointment of
counsel in these cases - with trial courts denying counsel almost
50% of the time.42
1. Under the United States Constitution
Unlike in criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment does not guar-
antee representation by counsel in civil cases, including immi-
gration cases. 43 Hence, any right to counsel in removal
proceedings would have to be based on a Fifth Amendment Due
Process right.44
In Larra-Torres v. Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit summarized in
two parts the test for a detainee to show a violation of his or her
Fifth Amendment Due Process rights through ineffective assis-
tance of counsel: "(1) the alleged ineffective assistance rendered
the proceeding so fundamentally unfair that they were pre-
vented from reasonably presenting their case, and (2) substan-
41 I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("A deportation pro-
ceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this coun-
try, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully
in this country is itself a crime.... The judge's sole power is to order deporta-
tion; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any crime
related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country.")
42 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY2011 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK, at G1. (2012).
43 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that, since deportation and removal proceedings are
civil, they are "not subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards ac-
companying criminal trials.")
44 See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In deportation
proceedings, an alien's right to be represented by counsel is based on the due
process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. [citations] .... Accordingly, in-
effective assistance of counsel in a deportation hearing results in a denial of
due process under the Fifth Amendment only when the proceeding is so fun-
damentally unfair that the alien is prevented from reasonably presenting her
case [citation.]")
Volume 8, Number 2 Spring 2015
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tial prejudice, which is essentially a demonstration that the
alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceedings. '45
In other words, there is no right to counsel in immigration
proceedings, and the burden on the detainee to show ineffective
assistance is extremely high.
One example where the U.S. Supreme Court did find ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel was in Padilla v. Kentucky, where a
non-citizen was not advised of his potential removal conse-
quences when he pled guilty in a criminal case.46 Padilla, a law-
ful immigrant from the Honduras, had been a United States
permanent resident for forty years.47 Upon his counsel's advice
that he would "not have to worry" about immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea, Padilla pled guilty to marijuana trans-
port.48 However, his attorney's advice turned out to be
incorrect.49 Padilla v. Kentucky is sometimes acknowledged as a
first step towards a constitutional right to counsel in removal
proceedings.50
2. Statutory Protection
The statutory right to counsel in removal proceedings is
empty. In theory, any person facing removal is entitled by stat-
ute to be represented by counsel; however, the catch is that this
representation must be "at no expense to the Government."51
45 Lara-Torres v. Gonzales, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 28368, 8-9 (9th Cir. 2005)
(internal citations, quotation marks, and formatting omitted).
46 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
47 <Could you please fix citation> I have only S. Ct citation 130 S.Ct 1473,
1477 (2010).
48 Id. at 1478.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla
v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amend-
ment, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1461, 1468 (2011) ("It means, simply put, that
noncitizen criminal defendants now have a right to competent deportation
counsel in criminal court.")
51 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
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3. Recent Case Law Regarding Right to Counsel
in Removal Proceedings
Four years after Padilla, there was a significant step towards
implementing right to counsel for immigrants. In a case involv-
ing persons with serious mental disorders facing removal, the
Central District of California ruled that such a 'class' of people
had the right to be represented by competent counsel.52
In a case where the detainees were represented by some very
able advocates at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
Judge Gee, writing for the district court, issued preliminary in-
junctions requiring the federal government to insure legal repre-
sentation for a specific class of plaintiffs. 53 This class of plaintiffs
consisted of immigrants with mental disabilities who had been
held for years by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) without any active proceedings. 54 The government de-
tained and placed into removal proceedings members of this
class, who were clearly not competent to represent themselves,
and the government "imposed on itself no legal obligation to
provide representation for such individuals in their immigration
proceedings."5 5 The government argued that "legal representa-
tion for all mentally incompetent aliens detained for removal
proceedings . . . amount[ed] to a 'fundamental alteration' of the
immigration court system, primarily because the Executive Of-
fice of Immigration Review [did] not have the capacity or fund-
ing to implement such a program." 56 The ACLU argued, on
behalf of the class, that the federal Rehabilitation Act required
legal representation as a "reasonable accommodation" under
52 Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258 (2013). See
supra note 2. See also Lucas Guttentag, & Ahilan Arulanantham, Extending
the Promise of Gideon: Immigration, Deportation, and the Right to Counsel,
ABA Human Rights Magazine, VOL. 39 No. 4 (2012).
53 Franco-Gonzales, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258Supra note 2, at *14.
54 Id. at *8.
55 Id.
56 Id. at *21.
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section 504.57 The court sided with the detainees, finding that
they only sought to participate meaningfully in the immigration
court process. On the question of funding such a program, the
court noted:
The Court is wary of issuing an unfunded mandate
requiring Government-paid counsel for all men-
tally incompetent class members. Indeed, neither
this Order nor the Court's previous preliminary
injunction rulings requires [the government] to
provide [detainees] with paid legal counsel. [The
government has] in the past been able to obtain
pro bono counsel for certain class members from
various non-profit organizations and pro bono
panels.58
Although only a small step, and although decided on the basis
of the federal Rehabilitation Act and not Due Process under the
Fifth Amendment, Franco-Gonzales is nevertheless a significant
step towards the realization of the right to court-appointed
counsel in removal proceedings, especially considering the
court's comment on the question of funding such a program.
4. California State Law
Unfortunately, given the federal nature of the subject matter,
states can do little to alleviate the problem of competent counsel
in immigration matters. As noted before, removal proceedings
and dependency proceedings share a lot in common with each
other, and with criminal proceedings. However, in California for
57 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(A) (2012) subsection (a) ("No otherwise qualified in-
dividual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of
this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency...").")
58 Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258 at *23 (2013).
Supra note 2, at 23.
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example, while the latter two are covered by statutes and
favorable case law interpreting those statutes, the first area is
mostly unreachable by state legislation. Authors have described
this partial disconnect between state and federal agencies a
"Kafkaesque" situation.59
II. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS RESULTING IN TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS - A VOID
The problem of the lack of right to counsel is especially acute
in an area of overlap between removal and dependency pro-
ceedings: that is, when a removal of a non-citizen will effectively
result in termination of parental rights. This puts immigrant par-
ents at an increased risk of losing their parental rights because
of lack of access to counsel. Indeed, such a situation is even sad-
der for the parents because unlike in dependency cases, there is
no claim that they have been unfit caregivers. I examine that
area in the last sections of this paper.
Very often removal proceedings are coupled with proceedings
resulting in termination of parental rights. As mentioned, the
majority of states, including California, have determined that
due process mandates the appointment of counsel before paren-
tal rights may be terminated. 60 However, because of the curious
nature of bifurcation of authority between Congress in immigra-
59 Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 101-03 (2011). See also Vinita
Andrapalliyal, The CPS Took My Baby A way: Threats to Immigrant Parental
Rights and a Proposed Federal Solution, 7 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173, *175,
f.n. 26 (2013) (noting that "Family law is primarily under the purview of state
law, while the federal government oversees most of our immigration law.")
60 See S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My Daughter. Deportation and The
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 85, 98 (2007) ("Be-
cause parental rights are often terminated once a parent is deported, a re-
moval hearing may be the only hearing that the parent receives before her
rights are terminated. To refuse counsel to immigrants when such a funda-
mental right is on the line seems to violate due process.")
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tion cases and the states in child custody cases, this statutory
right to counsel does not help non-U.S. citizens facing removal.
The Ninth Circuit addressed a situation where an alien's re-
moval would leave behind his two minor U.S. citizen children, in
Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales.61 In Cabrera-Alvarez, the peti-
tioner-alien sought to cancel his removal to prevent hardship to
his children. He contended that the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child supported his request to cancel re-
moval.62 The court denied the alien's petition, noting that the
Convention had not been ratified by the United States, but even
if it had been, the alien's situation did not meet the "exceptional
and extremely unusual" standard demanded by the text of 8
U.S.C.S. § 1229(b).63
Judge Pregerson's dissent in this case contains noteworthy
language pointing out the practical difficulties of meeting such a
high standard:
Under the removal statute, the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) may grant an application for
cancellation of removal only where removal would
cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hard-
ship" to the petitioner's citizen or lawful perma-
nent resident family members - here, Cabrera-
Alvarez's two young United States citizen chil-
dren, ages eight and ten. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). That onerous standard is so dif-
ficult to satisfy that there is only one published
BIA decision that grants cancellation of removal
after finding that the requisite "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" existed.64
61 Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005).
62 See U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Nov. 20, 1989, ART.
3(1), 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1459 (1989).
63 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229B (B) (1) (D).
64 Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d at 1014.
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III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
In practice, although there is no right to counsel in immigra-
tion proceedings, including those that result in termination of
parental rights, there are other avenues for indigent litigants to
obtain representation. For example, there is court-ordered assis-
tance in specific cases and there are volunteer organizations
helping detainees.
However, there are various approaches that could help create
a right to counsel in immigration proceedings, or alternatively,
provide free access to competent counsel.
A. Trial Courts
Courts should be more cognizant of the situation and use
their discretion to appoint counsel when removal may possibly
result in termination of parental rights. This is the easiest ap-
proach in theory because it requires no change to existing law.
However, this is also the most difficult approach in practice, be-
cause without a law ensuring right to counsel, uniformity among
the district courts can never be achieved.
B. Federal Legislative Action Statutes (Existing
and Proposed Statutes)
One approach to providing a federal statutory right to counsel
in removal proceedings, mirroring the state statutes providing
counsel in dependency proceedings, would be to amend Section
1362 of 8 U.S.C.65 As mentioned earlier, in its current form Sec-
tion 1362 provides: "In any removal proceedings before an im-
migration judge and in any appeal proceedings before the
Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the per-
son concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at
65 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). Supra note 48.
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no expense to the Government) .... "66 The phrase "at no ex-
pense to the Government" can be removed through an amend-
ment, thereby providing for assistance at the government's
expense. Alternatively, following reasoning similar to that in
Franco-Gonzales, at least a Qualified Representative should be
made available to non-citizens facing removal. This can come at
very little or no cost to the government.67
Another statutory approach would be to create new statutes
in the area of removal proceedings that also involve family law.
One such recommendation worth noting was made by
Andrapalliyal. 68
C. Finding a Constitutional Right to Counsel Under the
Due Process Clause - Case Law
As discussed, the development of case law in the area of im-
migration right to counsel has been promising. Future case law
could extend Lassiter and Padilla to re-interpret Due Process
rights under the Fifth Amendment to include those proceedings
in which a non-citizen faces removal, at least specifically where a
termination of parental rights could result.
In other words, if the U.S. Supreme Court re-interprets the
Due Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment as requiring
66 Id.
67 See Franco-Gonzales 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186258 supra note 2, at *14.
A "Qualified Representative" requirement by statute would parallel that of
the Rehabilitation Act.
68 Andrapalliyal, supra note 4857, at 187 (proposing the Immigrant Child
Welfare and Parental Rights Act [ICWPRA], noting "the ICWPRA should
also provide for assistance of counsel for immigrant parents faced with TPR
proceedings against them, if not in all involuntary custody proceedings.
Equipping indigent immigrant parents with assistance of counsel at the fed-
eral level may cut down on unjustified parental rights terminations by ensur-
ing that all immigrant parents have a knowledgeable advocate to inform
them about the law and make their case .... [Plerhaps the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) can pay the costs and fees associated
with the appointments.")
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effective representation by counsel in removal proceedings, es-
pecially those resulting in termination of parental rights, then
this unfortunate situation would be fully resolved, However,
such an interpretation is radical and unlikely in the immediate
future.
IV. CONCLUSION
There has been a lot of scholarship on Civil Gideon, or the
right to counsel in certain civil cases. So far, case law from the
United States Supreme Court has been discouraging in that
there has been no indication of interpreting the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process rights to find a civil right to counsel.
However, certain areas in family law, specifically those where
parents could potentially lose the right to their children, have
been addressed by state legislatures that step in, affording statu-
tory right to counsel to parents. These statutes have generally
been favorably interpreted by the courts.
On the other hand, rather ironically, immigrants presently do
not have right to counsel in proceedings where the exact same
consequences may result, because of unfortunate federalism is-
sues. This presents an illogically unfair situation for immigrant
parents, because unlike in dependency cases, there is no claim
that they are unfit parents.
There is an immediate and critical need to fill this void, either
statutorily, or through re-interpretation of the Constitution
through case law.
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